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ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NONAGGREGATIVE
PRIORITY FOR THE WORST OFF*
By Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden,
and Peter Vallentyne
I. Introduction
We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with pro-
moting the benefits (e.g., well-being) of individuals and shall explore the
possibility of such theories’ ascribing some priority to benefits to those
who are worse off —without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism
(which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits)
ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alter-
natives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second
worst off, and so on) ascribes absolute priority to the worse off (i.e., favors
even a very small benefit to a worse-off person over very large benefits to
large numbers of better-off people). Neither extreme view, we assume, is
plausible.
One intermediate view is finitely weighted total prioritarianism. It is like
utilitarianism except that it is concerned with total weighted benefits. It
differs, however, in that there is a prioritarian weighting for benefits:
benefits to individuals have finitely decreasing marginal weights (i.e., the
moral importance of a one-unit increase in benefits is smaller the more
units the individual already has). Thus, like leximin, it gives priority to
the worse off. Unlike leximin, however, this priority is not absolute or
infinite. Large enough benefits to the better off can take priority over the
benefits to a worse-off individual. Finitely weighted total prioritarianism
is commonly considered an attractive compromise between utilitarianism
and leximin. It shares with utilitarianism, however, a questionable prop-
erty: namely, that it justifies that a significant benefit to the worst-off
person can be outweighed by trivial benefits to enough best-off people. In
this sense, it can be argued that it does not give enough priority to the
worse off.
Is it possible to avoid the problem of finitely weighted total prioritarian-
ism without assigning absolute priority to the worse off? We show that it
is not easy to do so. We do this by considering the possibility of combin-
ing nonaggregative priority for the worst off over the best off while also
allowing some aggregation (e.g., when the worst off are not affected).
* For most helpful comments, we thank Nils Holtug, Mike Otsuka, Ellen Paul, Alex
Voorhoeve, the other contributors to this volume, and its editors.
doi:10.1017/S0265052509090116
258 © 2008 Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA.
II. General Background
Throughout, we leave open the relevant conception of benefit (resources,
primary goods, brute luck well-being, etc.). References to a person’s being
worse off than another should be understood in terms of whatever ben-
efits are relevant.
We shall assume, for the sake of argument, that benefits are fully
measurable and interpersonally comparable. This may seem like a strong
assumption, but in the present context it avoids burdening our analysis
with informational constraints. The assumption that benefits are so mea-
surable and comparable does not entail that such information is rele-
vant for the moral assessment of options. The assumption is simply
that such information is available. This ensures that no principle of
moral goodness is ruled out merely on the grounds that it presupposes
that benefits are measurable or comparable in ways that they are not.
Our main argument is that no moral theory satisfies all of certain seem-
ingly plausible conditions —even if benefits are fully measurable and
interpersonally comparable. In this context, the measurability and com-
parability assumptions should make it easier to find a satisfactory theory
and thus strengthen the significance of our conclusions.
We shall be concerned with the assessment of the moral goodness of
alternatives, where alternatives are possible objects of choice (e.g., actions
or social policies). Alternatives may have all kinds of features: they gen-
erate a certain distribution of benefits, satisfy or violate various rights,
involve various intentions, and so on. In what follows, we shall assume
that the only relevant information for the assessment of moral goodness
is the benefit distribution that an alternative generates. More formally, we
shall assume:
Benefitism: Alternatives can be identified with, and their moral good-
ness assessed solely on the basis of, their benefit distributions.
Benefitism is a generalization of welfarism (the view that alternatives
can be assessed solely on the basis of the resulting distributions of wel-
fare). Although it does not assume that welfare is all that matters, it does
assume that moral goodness supervenes on individual benefits. If two
alternatives generate the same distribution of benefits, then they have the
same status with respect to moral goodness.
Benefitism is a very strong assumption. It rules out the relevance, for
example, of respecting the wills of agents (e.g., as reflected in their con-
sent), if this is not part of the evaluation of alternatives. It holds that there
is no difference with respect to moral goodness between forcing a person
to go jogging against her will and merely successfully encouraging her to
do so, if the benefits to her and everyone else are the same. Although we
would reject this condition because of this implication (or doubt that
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benefits can be the same in this example, on a reasonable measure of
benefits), we shall here grant it, since it is not relevant for the issue at
hand. The issue of whether something like leximin is the only plausible
egalitarian theory of moral goodness arises even if equality-promotion is
limited, for example, to those alternatives that respect the wills of agents
(e.g., violate no rights). Granting Benefitism will simplify the presenta-
tion. The results could, however, be recast to apply only where the rele-
vant differences between alternatives concern the distributions of benefits
that they generate.
Given Benefitism, we can identify an alternative with the benefit dis-
tribution that it generates, and in what follows we shall do so for sim-
plicity. We shall further assume that all distributions of benefits display
non-negative benefits (zero is the lowest conceivable level). Finally, we
assume that the set of benefit distributions generated by the set of pos-
sible alternatives is rich in the following sense:
Domain Richness: For any logically possible benefit distribution with
a finite number of individuals and non-negative benefits, there is an
alternative that generates that distribution.
This condition rules out, for example, the possibility that, where there
are three people, the distribution ^3,7,9& (3 units of benefit to the first
person, 7 to the second, 9 to the third) is not one of the alternatives. It also
rules out the possibility that distributions involving certain (e.g., very
large) finite population sizes are not among the alternatives. The condi-
tion requires that all logically possible benefit distributions are among the
alternatives. This is not to say that all are part of any given feasible set (the
alternatives that are open to an agent on a given occasion). Of course,
there are lots of logically possible benefit distributions that are not feasi-
ble on a given occasion. The claim here is about the range of benefit
distributions that can be assessed in terms of moral goodness. The con-
dition holds that such judgments can be made for all logically possible
distributions.
We believe that this is a highly plausible condition. Benefit distribu-
tions here play the role of test cases for a theory of moral goodness. All
logically possible test cases —assuming, as we shall, a finite population —
are admissible.
We shall focus on various conditions governing moral goodness. More
exactly, we shall first focus on the relation, between alternatives, of being
morally at least as good as another. Following the standard definitions,
we shall say that (1) an alternative is morally better than another if and
only if it is at least as good and the other is not at least as good as it; and
(2) an alternative is equally morally as good as another if and only if it is at
least as good and the other is also at least as good as it. We do not assume
that the moral betterness relation is complete (i.e., that for any two alter-
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natives, at least one is at least as good as the other). Some alternatives
may be morally incomparable with others.
III. Moral Betterness
We start by reporting a slight modification of a result from Marc
Fleurbaey and Bertil Tungodden showing that, given some standard con-
ditions, it is impossible to satisfy a very weak aggregation condition and
a very weak prioritarian condition.1 Throughout, we are concerned with
theories that give priority to those who are worse off than others. Our
conditions, however, shall focus on the special case of the priority given
to the worst-off individuals in society.
Benefits to the worse off should, we assume, have some priority over
benefits to the better off, and this should ensure that a given benefit to a
worst-off individual has priority over a sufficiently smaller benefit to all of
the best-off individuals —no matter how many best-off people there are.
More exactly, we propose to capture this idea by the following condition:
Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: For any pair of benefit levels, for any
alternative in which the benefits of the worst off are at or below the
lower benefit level and the benefits of the best off are at or above the
higher benefit level, and for any benefit gain to a worst-off person,
there is a sufficiently small benefit loss to every best-off person such
that, if those who are best off remain best off and the worst-off
individual who gains does not become a best-off person, then the net
result is morally better —no matter how many best-off persons there
are.
Compare, for example, ^3,8,8& and ^1,9,9&. Compared with the second
alternative, the first alternative gives the worst-off person 3 units rather
than 1 unit of benefit. It also gives the two best-off individuals 8 units
rather than 9 units of benefit. Minimal Nonaggregative Priority does not
require that the first alternative be judged better than the second —since
it does not tell us whether the loss of 1 to the best off is small enough
relative to a gain of 2 for the worst off. If, however, a one-unit loss is small
enough to satisfy the condition when the worst-off person starts with 1
unit and gains 2 units and the best-off persons start with 9 units, then the
1 Marc Fleurbaey and Bertil Tungodden, “The Tyranny of Non-Aggregation Versus the
Tyranny of Aggregation in Social Choices: A Real Dilemma” (unpublished, 2007). In order
to streamline the presentation of our later results, we introduced the following modifica-
tions of one of Fleurbaey and Tungodden’s results. We strengthened both the priority
condition and the aggregation condition by requiring the modified benefit distribution to be
better than the original —and not merely at least as good. This strengthening permits us to
invoke Acyclicity rather than the stronger Transitivity and to drop Weak Pareto for certain
results.
NONAGGREGATIVE PRIORITY FOR THE WORST OFF 261
condition does require that the first alternative be judged better —not only
is ^3,8,8& better than ^1,9,9&, but also ^3,8, . . . ,8& is better than ^1,9, . . . ,9&,
no matter how many best-off persons there are.
Minimal Nonaggregative Priority merely affirms that the worst-off per-
son has a certain weak kind of nonaggregative priority over others. It holds
that, for a given gain to a worst-off person, there is a sufficiently small loss
to the best off such that the gain to the worst off is favored —no matter
how many best off have the small loss (and thus no matter how great the
total loss for the best off ). The condition rules out the tyranny of aggre-
gation (e.g., only considering total benefits) by placing limits on admis-
sible forms of aggregation.
This is a weak condition in several ways. First, it only gives priority to
a worst-off person in comparison with the best-off persons. It does not
require that the badly off in general have priority over those who are
better off. Second, it does not give absolute priority to the worst off. It is
compatible with favoring a larger benefit to a best-off person over a
smaller benefit to the worst-off person. Finally, the size of the loss for the
best off that makes it sufficiently small to be outweighed by a given gain
for the worst off may depend both on the level of benefits (prior to any
gain or loss) of the best off and the level of benefits of the worst off. For
example, one might think that what counts as a sufficiently small loss to
the best off is larger the lower the benefit level of the worst-off individual
and also larger the greater the benefit level of the best off.
The Minimal Nonaggregative Priority condition combines priority for
the worst off with a limitation on aggregation that has been much dis-
cussed in the literature. T. M. Scanlon asks, for example, whether, in order
to eliminate an hour of extremely painful electrical shocks to one person,
we should impose much smaller costs (e.g., the loss of fifteen minutes of
World Cup television coverage) on several million people. His view is
that we should and that this is true independently of whether the one
person who is helped is, or would be (without help), the worst-off per-
son.2 The condition we are discussing imposes Scanlon’s aggregation-
2 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1998), 235. For further discussion of the relevance of aggregation of ben-
efits (e.g., the small losses of many adding up to a large total loss), see David Brink, “The
Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory,” in R. G. Frey and C. W.
Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
252–89; Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
chaps. 5–6; Rahul Kumar, “Contractualism on Saving the Many,” Analysis 61 (2001): 165–70;
Alastair Norcross, “Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 26 (1997): 135–67; Alastair Norcross, “Two Dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation,
Rights, and the Separateness of Persons,”elsewhere in this volume; Michael Otsuka, “Scanlon
and the Claims of the Many Versus the One,” Analysis 60 (2000): 288–93; Michael Otsuka,
“Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004):
413–26; Michael Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006): 109–35; Derek Parfit, “Innumerate Ethics,” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 285–301; Derek Parfit, “Justifiability to Each Person,” Ratio 16
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limitation idea, but applies it only to the case where the loss is imposed
on best-off individuals and is sufficiently small. It is thus much weaker
than the general aggregation-limitation idea.
This condition is violated by utilitarianism (which gives no priority to
the worst off ) and also by finitely weighted prioritarianism (which gives
some finite priority to the worse off, but which can be outweighed by
gains to best-off people that are as small as you like, as long as there are
enough such people). Leximin, however, satisfies this condition (since it
always gives absolute priority to the worse off ).
The next condition requires that there should be at least some limited
form of aggregation:
Minimal Aggregation: For any benefit distribution, imposing a loss on
one person and gains on everyone else makes things morally better
if the loss is small enough and the gains are large enough.
This condition is very weak. It rules out leximin, but both utilitarianism
and finitely weighted prioritarianism satisfy it. It only requires that a loss
for one person is outweighed by the gains to others, when the gain is
sufficiently large and the loss is sufficiently small. It says, for example,
that things are made morally better by increasing the benefits for a mil-
lion people by 100 units and decreasing the benefits of the worst-off
person by some sufficiently small amount (e.g., some completely trivial
amount). This condition does not require that the alternative with the
greater total benefits always be judged better. It is silent, for example,
about whether things are made morally better by increasing the benefits
for a million people by 100 units and decreasing the benefits of the worst-
off person by 100 units (since the gain of 100 for others may not be large
enough to offset the loss of 100 for the one person).
Finally, Fleurbaey and Tungodden endorse three standard conditions:
Transitivity, Weak Pareto, and Replication Invariance. We discuss each of
these in turn.
Consider first:
Transitivity: If, for alternatives, x, y, and z, x is morally better than y,
and y is morally better than z, then x is morally better than z.
This, of course, is a very standard assumption. In what follows, we only
need a much weaker assumption:
(2003): 368–90; T. M. Scanlon, “Replies,” Ratio 16 (2003): 424–39; John Taurek, “Should the
Numbers Count?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977): 293–316; and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 6.
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Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1, . . . xn, x1 is morally better than x2, x2
is morally better than x3, . . . and xn−1 is morally better than xn, then
xn is not morally better than x1.
Acyclicity is about as close to being uncontroversial as one can get when
it comes to consistency requirements on the moral-betterness relation. If x1
is better than x2, and x2 is better than x3, then Acyclicity, like Transitivity,
rules out the possibility that x3 is better than x1. Unlike Transitivity, how-
ever, Acyclicity allows that x1 and x3 may be equally good or incomparable.
The second standard condition introduced in Fleurbaey and Tungod-
den’s analysis is:
Weak Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has
greater benefits in x than in y, then x is morally better than y.
Weak Pareto is a weak efficiency condition on the promotion of benefits
(much weaker than the utilitarian sum-total conception of efficiency). It
requires, for example, that ^2,4,6& be judged morally better than ^1,3,5&
and also morally better than ^1,1,5&. It is silent about whether ^2,4,6& is
morally better than ^99,1,6&. This is, we believe, an extremely plausible
condition. It is satisfied by utilitarianism, leximin, and finitely weighted
total prioritarianism.
The third standard condition introduced in Fleurbaey and Tungod-
den’s analysis is the condition that moral goodness is not affected when
the number of people in a distribution is increased by “replication.” Let
an n-replication of a given distribution of benefits be the result of adding,
for each person with benefits b, n−1 new people with benefits b. For
example, a 3-replication of ^2,6& is ^2,6,2,6,2,6&. Our definition of the con-
dition, then, is:
Replication Invariance: For any two alternatives, x and y, and any
positive integer n, x is morally at least as good as y if and only if the
n-replication of x is morally at least as good as the n-replication of y.
This requires, for example, that if ^1,5& is at least as good as ^2,3&, then
^1,5,1,5,1,5& is at least as good as ^2,3,2,3,2,3&. We believe that this condition
is highly plausible. It is satisfied by leximin, utilitarianism, and finitely
weighted total prioritarianism. Replication does not affect average ben-
efits, and thus average utilitarianism satisfies the condition. N-replication
does affect the total of a given alternative, but it does so by multiplying the
total by n. Thus, if the total of one alternative is at least as great as that of
a second, the total of an n-replication of the first will be at least as great as
that of an n-replication of the second. Thus, total utilitarianism satisfies the
Replication-Invariance condition. Finitely weighted total prioritarianism
satisfies the condition for similar reasons (given that the weights are based
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on the absolute level of the benefit). Leximin also satisfies the condition,
because a replication will not change the level of the worst off (or second
worst off, and so on) in any of the two alternatives in a comparison.
A slight modification of the proof in Fleurbaey and Tungodden’s earlier
analysis yields the following result:
Result 1: No moral-betterness relation satisfies Weak Pareto, Replica-
tion Invariance, Acyclicity, Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, and Min-
imal Aggregation.3
The proof takes roughly the following form: The first four conditions
entail that an alternative that gives greater benefits to the worst-off person
is not morally worse. This violates the last condition, which requires that,
at least in some case (where the gain for the worst off is small enough in
relation to the gain of others), the alternative in question is morally worse
(or equal). Hence, we have an impossibility.
Let us note how some standard theories violate at least one of the fore-
going five conditions. Leximin satisfies all the conditions except Minimal
Aggregation. Utilitarianism (average and total) and finitely weighted total
prioritarianism satisfy all the conditions except for Minimal Nonaggrega-
tive Priority. Thus, none of these standard theories satisfies both Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority and Minimal Aggregation. Fleurbaey and Tungod-
den prove more generally that no theory satisfies all the conditions.4
This result suggests that it is impossible to combine a plausible kind of
aggregation with a plausible kind of priority for the worse off. Indeed,
because the priority condition is merely a special case of a more general
limitation on the role of aggregation (roughly: not allowing a large num-
ber of small enough gains to take priority over a single large loss), the
results show that it is not possible to limit aggregation in this way. One
might, of course, wonder whether some of the conditions discussed above
are implausibly strong. We shall now show that the impossibility result
remains even with significant weakenings of these conditions, and even
if we do not invoke Weak Pareto.
First, however, let us note that the impossibility is not an inherent
incompatibility between the aggregation condition and the priority con-
dition. These two conditions are compatible —even in conjunction with
Weak Pareto and Transitivity. These conditions are satisfied, for example,
3 Fleurbaey and Tungodden (“The Tyranny of Non-Aggregation”) also establish an impos-
sibility result which relies on a version of Minimal Aggregation that focuses on the cases
where there is a uniquely-worst-off individual who remains the worst off even after he
receives the benefit gain, and where Replication Invariance is replaced with a condition
called Reinforcement. Reinforcement states that if x is better than y, then x9 is better than y9
if the only difference between x and x9 and y and y9 is that a person who is better off in y
than in x is removed in y9 and in x9.
4 See Fleurbaey and Tungodden, “The Tyranny of Non-Aggregation Versus the Tyranny
of Aggregation.”
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by the geometric Gini betterness relation (a modification of the standard
Gini betterness relation, which weights benefits by the rank order: weight
of 1 for the highest benefits, 3 for the second-highest benefits, 5 for the
third-highest benefits, . . . and 2n − 1 for the worst-off level of benefits,
where there are n people). This relation ranks alternatives on the basis of
their total geometric Gini-weighted benefits, where the geometric Gini-
weights are, for instance, 1 for the benefits of the best-off position, 2 for
the benefits of the second-best-off position, 4 for the third-best-off posi-
tion, . . . . and 2n−1 for the benefits of the worst-off position (where there
are n people). (If there is more than one person at a given benefit level, the
relevant positions are allocated arbitrarily among them.) For example, the
geometric Gini-weighted benefits for ^2,4,6& add up to a total of 22 (2 ×
22 + 4 × 21 + 6 × 20). This betterness relation satisfies Minimal Aggregation,
since, for any benefit to others, there is a small enough loss to the worst-
off position such that the total of the Gini-weighted benefits is made
greater by the combination of benefits to others and loss to the uniquely
worst off. Geometric Gini also satisfies Minimal Nonaggregative Priority,
since the weight for the worst-off position (2n−1) is always greater than
the total weight given to others (1 + 2 + 4 + . . . + 2n−2, which equals 2n−1 −
1). For example, for three people, the weight for the worst off is 4 and the
total weight for the others is 3. Thus, for any given benefit to the worst off,
if everyone else loses no more than that benefit amount, the total weighted
benefits will be increased.
Geometric Gini, however, does not satisfy one of the standard condi-
tions discussed above, namely, Replication Invariance. To see this, con-
sider ^5,5&, ^3,10&, and their 2-replications, ^5,5,5,5& and ^3,3,10,10&. Geometric
Gini judges ^5,5& (weighted benefits of 1 × 5 + 2 × 5, or 15) as strictly worse
than ^3,10& (weighted benefits of 1 × 10 + 2 × 3, or 16), but it judges ^5,5,5,5&
(weighted benefits of 1 × 5 + 2 × 5 + 4 × 5 + 8 × 5, or 75) as strictly better
than ^3,3,10,10& (weighted benefits of 1 × 10 + 2 × 10 + 4 × 3 + 8 × 3, or 66).
One way of avoiding the impossibility result, then, is to reject Replica-
tion Invariance. We believe, however, that the condition is highly plau-
sible, and our focus will be on the other conditions.
Let us, then, reconsider Minimal Nonaggregative Priority. It requires
that priority be given to a benefit to a single worst-off person over a
sufficiently smaller benefit to each of the best-off individuals —no matter
how many there are. There are at least two ways that the priority may be
too strong.5 First, the benefit given to the worst-off individual may raise
her above the average in terms of benefits. One might accept the strong
5 A third way that one might think that the priority condition is too strong is that it
requires priority for just one worst-off person. One might agree that priority should be given
to benefits to the worst-off individuals when there are enough of them but reject the idea that
a single worst-off person should be given such priority. However, given Replication Invari-
ance, this is equivalent to the condition with only one person gaining. Thus, we do not
introduce this weakening of the priority condition.
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priority where the beneficiary remains below average, but reject it in
some cases where the beneficiary acquires significantly above-average
benefits.
Second, the priority condition may be too strong when the worst-off
individual is already superaffluent and the best off are only slightly better
off. Minimal Nonaggregative Priority says that giving the worst-off indi-
vidual a trivial benefit that keeps her below the others, makes things
better when coupled with a sufficiently smaller loss to each of the (very
slightly better off ) best-off individuals —no matter how many best-off indi-
viduals there are. The total loss in benefits will be enormous, if there are
enough best-off people. It may seem implausible to think that imposing
such a loss makes things morally better —where the only benefit is a
trivial benefit to one superaffluent individual. Similarly, one may object to
Minimal Nonaggregative Priority when both the best off and the worst off
are poor in absolute terms. One might, that is, favor priority where the
worst-off person is sufficiently poor in absolute terms and the best off are
sufficiently affluent in absolute terms without favoring it in other cases.
Consider, then, the following weakening of the priority condition:
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: There is a pair of benefit levels
such that for any alternative in which the benefits of the worst off are
below the lower benefit level and the benefits of the best off are
above the higher benefit level, and for any benefit gain to a worst-off
person, there is a sufficiently small benefit loss to every best-off
person such that, if (1) those who are best off remain best off and
above the higher benefit level, and (2) the worst-off individual remains
below average and below the lower benefit level, then the net result
is morally better —no matter how many best-off persons there are.
There are two differences between this condition and Minimal Nonag-
gregative Priority. First, Minimal Nonaggregative Priority only requires
that the worst-off individual to whom a benefit is given must remain
worse off than the best-off individuals —whereas the Ultra Minimal ver-
sion above requires that the worst-off individual must remain below
average with the benefit. The second difference is that Ultra Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority requires that the worst-off individuals be below
some benefit level (e.g., abject poverty) and that the best-off individuals
be above some higher benefit level (e.g., superaffluence). We believe that
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority is extremely plausible, and we
shall show that the impossibility result remains even with this weaker
priority condition.
Let us also reconsider Minimal Aggregation. Its most problematic impli-
cation concerns cases where there are just two people. Minimal Aggrega-
tion holds that giving a sufficiently large benefit to one person and imposing
a sufficiently small loss on the other makes things morally better. One
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might agree that giving enough people a sufficiently large benefit and
imposing a sufficiently small loss on one person makes things morally
better without holding that this is so when there is only one person who
gets the large benefit. For example, where the person suffering the loss is
the worst-off person, one might hold, in the two-person case, that the
changes make things morally worse. Consider, then, the following weak-
ening of the aggregation condition:
Ultra Minimal Aggregation: There is some positive population size
such that for any benefit distribution with a larger population, impos-
ing a small enough loss on one person and a large enough gain on
everyone else makes things morally better.
This is the same as Minimal Aggregation, except that it holds only for
sufficiently large populations (and not necessarily two-person popula-
tions). We believe that the weakened condition is extremely plausible. We
now note:
Result 2: No moral-betterness relation satisfies Replication Invari-
ance, Acyclicity, Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, and Ultra
Minimal Aggregation.
This result establishes that the impossibility result holds even when (1)
Minimal Nonaggregative Priority is replaced with the much weaker Ultra
Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, (2) Minimal Aggregation is replaced
with the much weaker Ultra Minimal Aggregation, (3) Transitivity is
replaced with the much weaker Acyclicity, and (4) Weak Pareto is removed.6
Here we can note that geometric Gini violates Replication Invariance,
utilitarianism and finitely weighted prioritarianism violate Ultra Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority, and leximin violates Ultra Minimal Aggrega-
tion. The proof generalizes this to show that no moral-betterness relation
satisfies all the conditions.
Let us provide an illustration of the structure of the proof:
(1) Suppose that Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority applies when
the worst-off individual is below 10 units of benefit, the best-off individ-
uals are above 80 units of benefit, and, for a gain to the worst off of 2 or
more, the loss to the best off needs only to be 1 or less. Consider now the
following sequence of alternatives for a population with five hundred
individuals, where initially there are one hundred individuals with ben-
efits of 0 and four hundred individuals with benefits of 200. In this
sequence, each successive alternative increases the benefits of one indi-
6 The proofs of this and all other results are posted online at http://mora.rente.nhh.no/
projects/EqualityExchange/.
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vidual from 0 to 3, and decreases the benefits of four hundred individuals
by one unit.
Z0: ^0,0, . . . ,0,200, . . . ,200&
Z1: ^3,0,0, . . . ,0,199, . . . ,199&
Z2: ^3,3,0,0, . . . ,0,198, . . . ,198&
. . .
Z99: ^3,3, . . . ,3,0,101, . . . ,101&
Z100: ^3,3, . . . ,3,3,100, . . . ,100&
In this sequence, Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority judges each alter-
native from Z1 to Z100 to be morally better than the previous one. Hence,
by Acyclicity, Z0 is not morally better than Z100.
(2) Suppose that Ultra Minimal Aggregation applies when the popula-
tion contains at least five people (n = 5), the gainers gain at least 50, and
the one loser loses less than 5. Consider the following alternatives:
X: ^3,100,100,100,100&
Y: ^0,200,200,200,200&
By Ultra Minimal Aggregation, Y is morally better than X.
(3) Consider the 100-replications of X and Y, 100-X and 100-Y. By (2), Y
is morally better than X. Hence, by Replication Invariance, 100-Y is mor-
ally better than 100-X. But this violates the conclusion in (1), given that
100-Y is Z0 and 100-X is Z100.
Thus, in this example, no moral-goodness relation satisfies the four
conditions. The proof generalizes this illustration for any values of the
parameters in Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority and Ultra Minimal
Aggregation.
We can weaken the priority condition even further and still obtain an
impossibility result. Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority has force no
matter how small the gain is to a worst-off individual. One might think
that the priority should hold only when the gain is large enough (e.g.,
nontrivial). Consider, then:
Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: There is a pair of benefit
levels and a minimum gain size (smaller than the lower benefit level)
such that for any alternative in which the benefits of the worst off are
below the lower benefit level and the benefits of the best off are
above the higher benefit level, and for any benefit gain to a worst-off
person that is no less than the minimum gain size, there is a suffi-
ciently small benefit loss to every best-off person such that, if (1)
those who are best off remain best off and above the higher benefit
level, and (2) the worst-off individual remains below average and
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below the lower benefit level, then the net result is morally better —no
matter how many best-off persons there are.
Even this weakening, however, does not avoid the impossibility result,
if we also impose the following very plausible condition:
Pigou-Dalton:7 A decrease in the benefits of one person combined
with an increase of the same amount in the benefits of a worse-off
person makes things morally better, if the originally worse-off person
does not become better off than the originally better-off person and
no other changes take place in the distribution.
This requires that a transfer from a better-off to a worse-off person must
be judged to make the situation morally better. For example, the condition
requires that ^7,5,2& be judged morally better than ^9,5,0&. It is an extremely
weak prioritarian condition. It merely requires that priority be given for
the worse off when the total benefits are not affected. It is completely
uncontroversial within a prioritarian approach. We now note:
Result 3: No moral-betterness relation satisfies Pigou-Dalton, Repli-
cation Invariance, Acyclicity, Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative
Priority, and Ultra Minimal Aggregation.8
Both Ultra Minimal Aggregation and Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggrega-
tive Priority seem very plausible. If a sufficiently large number of people
gain sufficiently, and just one person loses a sufficiently small amount
relative to these gains, then the result is morally better. To give absolute
priority to this one person in such cases seems wrong, even if the person
is the worst off. Thus, Ultra Minimal Aggregation is in line with our
intuition that moral goodness requires at least some aggregation. Super
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority also seems to capture a basic
moral intuition. It is always better to give a large enough gain to a worst-
off person and impose trivial losses on the best off (relative to the gain for
the worst off ) —no matter how many best-off individuals there are. Aggre-
7 This is a standard prioritarian condition from the social choice literature and is named
after Arthur Pigou and Hugh Dalton.
8 The following relation satisfies all the conditions except for Pigou-Dalton. Consider a
sequence of benefit thresholds, g, 2g, 3g, . . . , where g is the minimum gain of the worst off
appealed to in Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority. The relation judges that x is
morally at least as good as y if and only if (1) for some benefit threshold in the sequence, x
has fewer people below that threshold than y does but has the same number of people
below each of the lower thresholds, or (2) for every benefit threshold, the number of people
below that threshold is the same in x as in y, and the weighted total prioritarian benefits are
at least as great in x as in y. This violates Pigou-Dalton because a transfer from a person
above a threshold to a person below the threshold may push the better-off person below the
threshold, which makes things worse according to this relation.
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gation of such trivial losses is not relevant. Result 3 thus seems to estab-
lish that no plausible theory of moral goodness is sufficiently sensitive to
prioritarian and aggregative concerns. We shall now show that a similar
result holds for theories of moral permissibility.
IV. Moral Permissibility
Above, we focused on the axiological issue of moral betterness. We
shall now focus on the deontic issue of moral permissibility, which is not
a binary relation like moral betterness but a function selecting a subset of
permissible alternatives relative to a set of feasible alternatives. The alter-
natives selected from a feasible set are morally permissible (relative to this
set), while the other feasible options are morally impermissible. Just as for
moral betterness we consider all logically conceivable distributions of
benefits, for moral permissibility we will assume that all logically con-
ceivable sets of distributions are potential feasible sets over which moral
permissibility may be defined. No subsets of alternatives are excluded a
priori from the analysis.9
We shall reformulate the conditions of Result 2 in terms of a theory of
moral permissibility, that is, a theory that, for any feasible set of options,
specifies the subset that is permissible. Recall that throughout, we assume
Domain Richness, so that every logically possible distribution of benefits
is generated by some alternative. We will, however, restrict our attention,
in the rest of the essay, to feasible sets with a well-behaved boundary,
which implies that there is a maximum benefit for each individual. Con-
sider, then:
Deontic Replication Invariance: For any two alternatives, x and y, and
any positive integer n, if x is never (for any feasible set) permissible
when y is feasible, then the n-replication of x is never permissible if
the n-replication of y is feasible.
Consider, for example, the alternatives ^1,5& and ^2,3&. Deontic Replication
Invariance requires that if ^1,5& is never permissible when ^2,3& is feasible,
then ^1,5,1,5,1,5& is never permissible when ^2,3,2,3,2,3& is feasible.
We believe that this condition is highly plausible. It is satisfied by the
deontic version of leximin, utilitarianism, and finitely weighted total
prioritarianism —for essentially the same reasons that the corresponding
condition on moral betterness, Replication Invariance, is satisfied by these
theories (as explained in the previous section).
9 The axiological (moral betterness) and deontic (moral permissibility) approaches have
been exhaustively studied in the social choice literature, where they are known as the social
ordering and social choice function approaches. See, for example, Amartya Sen, “Social
Choice Theory: A Re-Examination,” Econometrica 45 (1977): 53–89, reprinted in Amartya Sen,
Choice, Welfare, and Measurement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 158–200.
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Consider next the following two conditions:
Deontic Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: There is a pair of ben-
efit levels such that for any alternative in which the benefits of the
worst off are below the lower benefit level and the benefits of the best
off are above the higher level, and for any benefit gain, there is a
sufficiently small benefit loss such that an option is not permissible
if, compared to it, some feasible alternative (1) gives the benefit gain
to the worst-off individual and leaves her below average and below the
lower benefit level, and (2) gives the benefit loss to all of the best off
and leaves them best off and above the higher benefit level.
Deontic Ultra Minimal Aggregation: There is some positive population
size such that, for any benefit distribution with a larger population,
an option is not permissible if some feasible alternative (1) gives one
person less benefits but the difference is small enough, and (2) gives
everyone else more benefits and the difference is large enough.
These two conditions are essentially the same as the original conditions
(Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority and Ultra Minimal Aggregation).
Instead of requiring that one alternative be judged better than another,
they require that, when both are feasible, one be judged impermissible.
In our analysis of moral permissibility, we will not impose any require-
ment of internal consistency. We will, however, adopt the perspective of
practical moral permissibility, according to which moral permissibility is
purely a matter of doing favorably relative to a feasible set. Hence, we
invoke the following condition:
No Prohibition Dilemmas: For any feasible set of alternatives, at least
one feasible alternative is permissible.
Of course, moral permissibility can be understood in a more ideal way
that does not guarantee that at least one feasible alternative is permissi-
ble, but we will focus here on practical moral permissibility.10
The following is the counterpart of Result 2:
10 It is important to note that the choice function approach of social choice theory has No
Prohibition Dilemmas implicitly built into it. This is because the concept of a choice function—a
function that, for any given feasible set, selects the subset consisting of all and only the
permissible alternatives relative to that feasible set —is defined to always select a nonempty
set. We here posit No Prohibition Dilemmas for practical moral permissibility, but for an
argument that prohibition dilemmas are conceptually possible (e.g., not ruled out by deontic
logic as such), see Peter Vallentyne, “Prohibition Dilemmas and Deontic Logic,” Logique et
Analyse 18 (1987): 113–22; and Peter Vallentyne, “Two Types of Moral Dilemmas,” Erkenntnis
30 (1989): 301–18.
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Result 4: No theory of moral permissibility satisfies No Prohibition
Dilemmas, Deontic Replication Invariance, Deontic Ultra Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority, and Deontic Ultra Minimal Aggregation.
Let us illustrate the proof with the same example and illustrative assump-
tions as in the illustration of the proof of Result 2 in Section III.
(1) Consider the feasible set consisting of Z0, . . . ,Z100, where
Z0, . . . ,Z100 are defined as in the illustration of the proof of
Result 2. By Deontic Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, for
all t = 0, . . . ,99, Zt is not permissible because Zt+1 is feasible.
(2) Let X and Y be defined as in the illustration of the proof of
Result 2. By Deontic Ultra Minimal Aggregation, X is not per-
missible when Y is feasible. By Deontic Replication Invariance,
the 100-replication of X is not permissible when the 100-replication
of Y is feasible. Given that the 100-replication of X is Z100 and the
100-replication of Y is Z0, Z100 is not permissible, given the
feasibility of Z0.
(3) By (1) and (2), no feasible alternative is permissible, which vio-
lates No Prohibition Dilemmas.
In the axiological case, we also had an impossibility where Pigou-
Dalton was imposed and the priority condition was further weakened to
have force only when the gains to the worst off are large enough (e.g.,
nontrivial). This impossibility also remains in the deontic case.
Deontic Pigou-Dalton: An option is not permissible if, compared to it,
some feasible alternative decreases the benefits of one person, increases
the benefits of a worse-off person by the same amount, leaves the
originally worse-off person no better off than the originally better-off
person, and involves no other changes in the distribution.
Deontic Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: There is a pair of
benefit levels and a minimum gain size (lower than the lower benefit
level) such that for any alternative in which the benefits of the worst-
off level are below the lower benefit level and the benefits of the
best-off level are above the higher benefit level, and for any benefit
gain to a worst-off person that is no less than the minimum gain size,
there is a sufficiently small benefit loss to all the best-off persons such
that an option is not permissible if, compared to it, some feasible
alternative (1) gives the benefit gain to the worst-off individual and
leaves her below average and below the lower benefit level, and (2)
gives the benefit loss to all of the best off and leaves them best off and
above the higher benefit level.
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Result 5: No theory of moral permissibility satisfies Deontic Pigou-
Dalton, Deontic Replication Invariance, Deontic Super Ultra Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority, and Deontic Ultra Minimal Aggregation.
These results establish that, if No Prohibition Dilemmas is imposed, the
impossibility result cannot be avoided simply by moving from moral
betterness to moral permissibility.
V. Avoiding Moral Nihilism
No theory of moral goodness, or of moral permissibility, satisfies the fore-
going seemingly very plausible conditions. This suggests that a plausible
account of moral goodness or of moral permissibility is not possible. This
is true, however, only if the conditions are plausible. Although we think
that each condition seems highly plausible, this plausibility must be reas-
sessed in light of the impossibilities. Because we believe that a plausible
theory of morality is possible, we believe that at least one of the conditions
is too strong. Here we shall examine some possible ways of weakening the
conditions. We should emphasize that we will not endorse any particular
way out. Our task is merely to give the reader a sense of possible ways out.
A. Dropping Acyclicity and No Prohibition Dilemmas
We strongly believe that Acyclicity and No Prohibition Dilemmas are
basic requirements of moral goodness and practical moral permissibility,
so we do not see the weakening or the removal of these requirements as
an appealing way out of the impossibility. Still, it may be instructive for
the understanding of our result, to briefly study what kind of conceptions
of moral goodness or moral permissibility become available if we do not
invoke these requirements.
Interestingly, it turns out that a rather prominent model of moral good-
ness and of moral permissibility, the complaint model proposed by Tho-
mas Nagel and by T. M. Scanlon, satisfies all the other conditions (including
the Pareto condition).11 The complaint model relies on the idea that, in a
comparison of two alternatives, we should do a pairwise consideration of
individual complaints. Here we shall focus on the binary complaint model,
which will be contrasted in Section V.D with the global complaint model.
On the binary complaint model, a person’s complaint for a given alter-
native is always relative to another alternative, and is equal to the amount
by which her finitely weighted prioritarian benefits (for some specified
set of weights) falls short from the largest amount she could get in either
of the two alternatives. For example, in comparing ^100,50& with ^10,60&,
11 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chap.
8; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, chap. 5.
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the first person has no complaint in ^100,50&, and the second person has
a complaint equal to the prioritarian value of 60 minus the prioritarian
value of 50. The axiological binary complaint model holds that one alterna-
tive is morally at least as good as another if and only if the maximum
(prioritarian) complaint in the one alternative is no greater than that in
the other —and, in case of ties, if and only if the second maximum com-
plaint is no greater, etc.
Nagel and Scanlon proposed this framework as a prioritarian view that
avoids the extreme implication of leximin that a worse-off person always
has priority, no matter how small her benefit. In their view, the better off
have priority when their gain is sufficiently greater than the gain of the
worse off (the complaints of the better off are greater if the raw benefit
shortfall is large enough). So the model satisfies Ultra Minimal Aggrega-
tion. However, if the worse-off person has the stronger claim, then the
worse off is given priority independently of the number of better-off
people that have a smaller claim, which implies that the model satisfies
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority. Finally, it follows trivially that
the model satisfies Replication Invariance, since the size of the greatest
claim will be invariant to any replication of an alternative.
Similarly, we can show that the deontic binary complaint model satisfies
the deontic versions of these conditions, where such a model judges an
alternative permissible if and only if no feasible alternative has a smaller
maximum complaint, or, in cases of ties, if no feasible alternative has a
smaller second largest complaint, etc.
To illustrate the axiological binary complaint model, let us assume that
the priority weighted benefits are measured by the square root of the
benefits.12 In comparing two alternatives, then, the magnitude of each
person’s complaint in a given alternative is equal to the difference between
the square root of her maximum benefit in the two alternatives and the
square root of her benefits in the given alternative. So, for example, if we
compare ^1,25& and ^4,9&, the respective complaints are ^1,0& and ^0,2&.
Thus, the greatest complaint is that of the second person in ^4,9&. Her
shortfall of 16 carries greater weight than the first person’s shortfall of 3
in ^1,25&—even though the second person is better off than the first per-
son. Thus, the axiological binary complaint model judges ^1,25& as mor-
ally better than ^4,9& (and favors the better-off person). As a second example,
compare ^4,100&with ^16,81&. Here, their respective complaints (i.e., short-
falls in the square roots of the benefits) are respectively ^2,0& and ^0,1&. The
greatest complaint is thus that of the first person in ^4,100&. Thus, this
complaint model judges ^16,81& as morally better (and favors the worse-
off person even though her benefit gain of 12 in ^16,81& is less than the
gain of 19 to the second person in ^4,100&).
12 See, for example, Alex Voorhoeve, “Should Losses Count? A Critique of the Complaint
Model,” LSE Choice Group Working Papers, vol. 2 (2006).
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The axiological binary complaint model, unfortunately, violates Acy-
clicity. The square-root version, for example, judges ^1,1,15& as better than
^1,0,17&—since in the former the largest complaint is much less than 1
(that of the third person) and in the latter it is 1 (that of the second
person). The model also judges ^1,0,17& as better than ^0,0,25&—since in
the former the largest complaint is less than 1 (that of the third person)
and in the latter it is 1 (that of the first person). Finally, this complaint
model also judges ^0,0,25& as better than ^1,1,15& (the first option above) —
since in the former the largest complaint is 1 (that of the first and second
persons) and in the latter it is slightly more than 1 (that of the third
person). Thus, the square-root version of the axiological binary complaint
model violates Acyclicity.
Similarly, if we assume that this sequence constitutes the feasible set of
alternatives, it follows straightforwardly that the deontic version of the
binary complaint model will not satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas.
Thus, if Acyclicity and No Prohibition Dilemmas are dropped, the binary
complaint model satisfies all the remaining conditions. As indicated above,
however, these two conditions are basic conditions of moral goodness
and practical moral permissibility, and thus this is not a promising way of
avoiding the impossibility result.
B. Dropping Replication Invariance
We have already shown that if we drop Replication Invariance, there
are conceptions of moral goodness that satisfy the remaining principles.
The geometric Gini moral-betterness relation satisfies both Ultra Minimal
Aggregation and Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, even in con-
junction with Weak Pareto and Transitivity. We find Replication Invari-
ance quite compelling, and therefore we doubt that the removal or
weakening of this condition could be a promising way out of the dilemma.
Note, however, how the geometric Gini manages to satisfy Ultra Min-
imal Nonaggregative Priority in spite of being clearly of the aggregative
kind. This is because with exponential weights geometric Gini’s aversion
to inequality (or degree of priority to the worse off ) increases with the
size of the population. This might make sense, even if it is not a popular
idea in the literature. A certain degree of inequality might appear more
alarming in a large population than in a small population, because it
means that more people are suffering from a disadvantaged position.
C. Weakening the aggregation condition
Ultra Minimal Aggregation requires that, for a sufficiently large pop-
ulation, imposing a sufficiently small loss on anyone and giving everyone
else a sufficiently large gain makes things morally better. It requires this,
even if the one loser is desperately poor and the gainers are all super-
276 FLEURBAEY, TUNGODDEN, AND VALLENTYNE
affluent. One might well question whether things are made morally better
in such a case. Clearly, some kind of aggregation is appropriate (we
shouldn’t focus solely on the worst off ), but this kind of aggregation, given
the other conditions, prevents giving sufficient priority to the worse off.
Consider, then, the following weakening of the aggregation condition:
Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation: There is some benefit level and some
positive population size such that, for any benefit distribution with a
larger population, imposing a loss on one person and gains on every-
one else makes things morally better, if the loss is small enough, the
gains are large enough, and those who gain remain below the spec-
ified benefit level.
This is exactly like the original Minimal Aggregation condition, except
that it does not apply if the gainers are above some fixed benefit level
(e.g., above a minimally adequate benefit level). It requires some kind of
aggregation of benefits for those below the fixed level, but does not
require the aggregation of benefits of those below that level with those
above. This is in the same general spirit as John Rawls’s idea of maxi-
mizing the aggregate benefits of the worst-off group (as opposed to the
benefits of the worst-off individual).13 The impossibility result disappears
if we so weaken the aggregation condition. Indeed, it disappears even if
we impose Transitivity (rather than the weaker Acyclicity), Minimal Nonag-
gregative Priority (rather than the weaker Ultra Minimal version), Pigou-
Dalton, and the following strong version of the Pareto condition:
Strong Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has at
least as great benefits in x as in y and some person has greater
benefits in x than in y, then x is morally better than y.
Strong Pareto has force when only some individuals have strictly greater
benefits in x than in y (whereas Weak Pareto has force only when every-
one has strictly greater benefits). Strong Pareto is still extremely plausible.
We now note the following possibility result:
Result 6: There is a moral-betterness relation that satisfies Strong
Pareto, Pigou-Dalton, Replication Invariance, Transitivity, Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority, and Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation.
Any member of the family of modified total poverty shortfall relations
satisfies all these conditions. Such prioritarian betterness relations are
defined as follows: They specify some fixed benefit level that defines the
poverty line (or minimum benefit level for a decent life). For each indi-
13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 98.
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vidual, her modified shortfall is defined as the shortfall in finitely weighted
prioritarian benefits (for some specified set of weights) from the poverty
line (and zero if not below that level). (For example, if the poverty line is
4 and the priority weighted benefits are the square root of the benefits,
then an individual who gets 1 unit of benefit has a modified shortfall of
1 [square root of 4 minus square root of 1].) One alternative is judged
morally at least as good as another just in case (1) its total shortfall is less
than that of the other, or (2) its total shortfall is equal to that of the other,
and its finitely weighted prioritarian total benefits (for some specified set
of weights) is at least as great. (The second clause is needed to ensure that
Strong Pareto is satisfied: that giving a benefit to someone above the
poverty line makes things better. The appeal to finitely weighted prioritar-
ian benefits ensures that the relation satisfies Pigou-Dalton.)
Modified total poverty shortfall relations satisfy all the conditions listed
in Result 6. Due to space limitations, we shall here address only the
aggregation condition. These relations violate Ultra Minimal Aggregation
but satisfy Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation. They violate the former
condition, because they give absolute priority to someone below the pov-
erty line over any number of people getting any sized benefit above the
poverty line (since benefits to those below the line reduce the total pov-
erty shortfall but benefits to those above it do not). Modified total poverty
shortfall relations, however, satisfy Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation. As
long as those receiving the benefits are below the poverty line, these
relations hold that giving enough people a large enough benefit and only
one person a smaller loss makes things morally better (since the total
poverty shortfall will be reduced).14 Result 6 establishes that it is possible
to combine nonaggregative priority with the very weak kind of aggrega-
tion required by Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation. This possibility also
applies in the deontic case (with a deontic version of the weaker aggre-
gation condition), but we shall limit our attention to the axiological case
(of moral betterness).
One possible way out of the impossibility result, then, is to weaken the
aggregation condition so as not to require that benefits to those above
some threshold can outweigh (under the specified conditions) benefits to
those below. This allows that any loss to people above the threshold can
14 Super Ultra Minimal Aggregation avoids the impossibility result because the condition
is applicable only when all the gainers are below some threshold (e.g., none are superaf-
fluent). Another (similar) way of weakening the aggregation condition to avoid an impos-
sibility result is to restrict its application to cases in which the one loser is above some
threshold (e.g., a poverty threshold). The idea is that aggregation is required among well-off
people, but, below the threshold, absolute priority to the worst-off may prevail. When such
a weakening of the aggregation condition is introduced, a possibility result obtains with a
modified total affluence relation, which deems x to be at least as good as y if and only if (1) the
leximin criterion restricted to positions below the threshold prefers x, or (2) x and y are
leximin indifferent with respect to positions below the threshold and x has finitely weighted
total prioritarian benefits (for some specified set of weights) that are at least as great as those
of y.
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be outweighed by an insignificant gain to one person below the thresh-
old, as long as this loss does not bring the losers below the threshold. For
example, a modified total poverty shortfall relation holds that things are
made morally better by (1) giving one person who is slightly below the
threshold a very small benefit that leaves her below the threshold, com-
bined with (2) reducing everyone else’s benefits from significantly above
the threshold to just at the threshold. Such a view is controversial, since
many people believe that some aggregation should be accepted between
the benefits of those below and those above the threshold. As we have
shown, however, it is impossible to combine a requirement of minimal
aggregation with a condition assigning minimal nonaggregative priority
to the worst off. So if one insists on allowing for some aggregation at all
levels, then the only option is to consider a weakening of the priority
condition.
D. Weakening the priority condition
Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority requires that a large
enough benefit to a worst-off individual, who is below a poverty threshold
and remains below the average, has priority over a sufficiently smaller loss
to all of the best-off individuals above an affluence threshold, no matter
how many best-off people there are. It gives nonaggregative priority to the
worst off in the sense that the number of best-off gainers is irrelevant.
It is, of course, possible to weaken the priority condition so that it does
not require nonaggregative priority. Finitely weighted prioritarianism, for
example, gives priority to the worse off but in an aggregative way (since
enough benefits to enough best-off people can outweigh any benefit to
the worst off ). We believe, however, that some kind of nonaggregative
priority for the worst off is plausible. Therefore, in what follows, we shall
focus on weakening the priority condition while still requiring some kind
of nonaggregative priority.
For the axiological case (moral betterness), we have not been able to
identify any promising weakening of the priority condition that both
preserves a significant nonaggregative priority for the worst off and avoids
the impossibility result. We have, however, identified such a weakening
for the deontic case (moral permissibility).
Deontic Super Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority holds that the
presence of an option that favors the worst off in a certain way over a
second option is sufficient for the second option to be impermissible. One
might think, however, that the force of the priority for the worst off
should be sensitive to what other options are feasible. For example, one
might think that, in a given choice situation, the moral importance of
giving a benefit to a given individual should depend in part on how far
short it leaves her from the best that she could achieve. Thus, one might
think (1) that ^1,0,4& is not permissible when the only feasible alternative
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is ^1,2,3& (since the worst-off individual in the former has a shortfall of 2
and the best-off individual in the latter has a shortfall of only 1), but (2)
that ^1,0,4&may be permissible when ^0,0,9& is also feasible (since now the
best off in ^1,0,4& has a shortfall of 5 units from her maximum, and this
may offset the shortfall of 2 [relative to ^1,2,3&] of the worst off ).
In light of this, it might be argued that the priority condition should be
weakened so as to apply only when there are two feasible options. The
following condition is identical to Deontic Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative
Priority, except that it applies only when there are only two feasible
alternatives:
Deontic Two-Option Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: There is a
pair of benefit levels such that, for any alternative in which the
benefits of the worst off are below the lower benefit level and the
benefits of the best off are above the higher level, and for any benefit
gain, there is a sufficiently small benefit loss such that an option is
not permissible if the only feasible alternative is one that, compared to
it, (1) gives the benefit gain to the worst-off individual and leaves her
below average and below the lower benefit level, and (2) gives the
benefit loss to all of the best-off individuals and leaves them best off
and above the higher benefit level.
This condition leaves open what kind of priority should be given to the
worst off when there are more than two feasible options. It merely insists
that the requisite nonaggregative priority is given in the simple case
where there are only two feasible options. This is enough, however, to
rule out finitely weighted prioritarianism. If there are enough best-off
individuals, this theory will judge an option permissible when the only
feasible alternative gives a benefit gain to the worst-off individual in the
case defined by the above condition. The condition is weak enough,
however, to avoid the impossibility result. Indeed, the impossibility result
is avoided even if we take the original axiological Minimal Nonaggrega-
tive Priority condition and convert it to a deontic condition but restrict it
to the two-option case. Consider then:
Deontic Two-Option Minimal Nonaggregative Priority: For any pair of
benefit levels, for any alternative in which the benefits of the worst
off are below the lower benefit level and the benefits of the best off
are above the higher level, and for any benefit gain, there is a suffi-
ciently small benefit loss such that an option is not permissible if the
only feasible alternative is one that, compared to it, (1) gives the benefit
gain to the worst-off individual and leaves her below average and
below the lower benefit level, and (2) gives the benefit loss to all of
the best off and leaves them best off and above the higher benefit
level.
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This condition entails the previous condition. We now note that the
impossibility result is avoided if we impose this “two-option” condition
instead of Deontic Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority —even if Strong
Pareto and Pigou-Dalton are also imposed.
Result 7: There are theories of moral permissibility that satisfy No
Prohibition Dilemmas, Strong Pareto, Pigou-Dalton, Deontic Repli-
cation Invariance, Deontic Two-Option Minimal (and Ultra Minimal)
Nonaggregative Priority, and Deontic Ultra Minimal Aggregation.
We shall illustrate the possibility of such theories by appealing to the
deontic complaint model, which judges a feasible alternative permissible
if and only if no other feasible alternative has a smaller maximum com-
plaint, or, in cases of ties, no smaller second-largest complaint, etc. Above,
we considered the binary version of this model, for which a person’s
complaint in a given option is always relative to some second specified
option. We showed that that version of the complaint model violates No
Prohibition Dilemmas. Here, we shall consider the global version of the
model, for which a person’s complaint in a given option is relative to a
specified feasible set. More exactly, relative to a given feasible set, a per-
son’s complaint in a given option is equal to the shortfall in priority
weighted benefits from the most that the individual can get in that feasible
set. For example, if the feasible set consists of ^5,3&, ^3,4&, and ^10,0&, then
the first person’s complaint in ^5,3& is equal the shortfall in prioritarian
benefits from 10. Unlike the binary model, the global model focuses solely
on the complaint relative to the best option in the feasible set. For exam-
ple, the fact that the first person has no complaint in ^5,3& relative to ^3,4&
(since she gets 5 rather than 3) is deemed irrelevant.
Unlike the binary version, the global version of the deontic complaint
model satisfies No Prohibition Dilemmas. There is always some option
that minimizes the greatest complaints (etc.) relative to the feasible set.
The deontic global complaint model, however, does not satisfy Deontic
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority. To see this, consider the follow-
ing feasible set, consisting of twenty options, where each option has
twenty poor people (to the left of the semicolon) and one rich person (to
the right of the semicolon). In the sequence below, each successive alter-
native increases the benefits of two individuals from 0 to 1, and decreases
the benefits of the best-off individual by half a unit.
^0,0, . . .0;25&
^1,1,0,0, . . .0;24.5&
^1,1,1,1,0,0, . . .0;23&
. . .
^1,1, . . .1,1,0,0;16&
^1,1, . . .1,1;15.5&
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Suppose, for illustration, that the priority condition applies when (1) the
least well off is 2 or below and the best off is 10 or above, (2) there are at
least two least-well-off people who gain, and (3) for a gain of 1 to the least
well off, the best off lose 0.5 or less. Given these assumptions, Deontic
Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority requires that all options but the
last be judged impermissible (on the basis of a comparison with any
subsequent option). The deontic global complaint model, however, can
judge one of these options (other than the last) permissible. If, for exam-
ple, prioritarian benefits are equal to the square root of the benefit, then
the model judges the second-to-last option permissible. This option min-
imizes maximum complaints (etc.). It has two poor people with com-
plaints of 1 (square root of 1 minus square root of 0) and one rich person
with a complaint of 1 (square root of 25 minus square root of 16), and
everyone else has 0 complaints. The last option has greater maximum
complaint, since the rich person has a complaint greater than 1 (the square
root of 25 minus the square root of 15 is greater than 1). All other options
have more than three people with complaints of 1. Thus, the second-to-
last option is judged permissible, which violates Deontic Ultra Minimal
Nonaggregative Priority.
The deontic global complaint model does, however, satisfy the weaker
Two-Option Minimal (and Ultra Minimal) Nonaggregative Priority. For any
given option, providing a benefit to a worst-off person and a small enough
loss to the best-off individuals (no mattter how many there are) produces
a distribution with a smaller largest complaint. Thus, the original option
will be judged impermissible, if these are the only two feasible options.
The global complaint model also satisfies all the remaining deontic
conditions and thus establishes the foregoing possibility result (Result 7).
Have we, then, finally found a significant possibility for moderate nonag-
gregative priority for the worse off? There are at least two ways of doubt-
ing this. One is the thought that the conditions imposed for Result 7 do
not leave room for a significant form of nonaggregative priority. After all,
the two-option priority conditions discussed above are completely silent
about priority for the worse off when there are more than two options.
The two-option priority conditions are indeed extremely weak. However,
the fact that the global complaint model is nonaggregative much more
generally indicates that it should be possible to strengthen the priority
condition and still keep the possibility result. We have not yet established
any interesting strengthening, however, and thus we leave this issue for
future research.
A second way of doubting that we have found a significant possibility
for moderate nonaggregative priority for the worse off is to claim that the
impossibility result reappears when further plausible conditions are intro-
duced. One such condition, deemed plausible by many, is the following
contraction consistency condition (concerning how the permissibility of
an option is affected when the feasibility set is contracted):
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Alpha: If an alternative is permissible relative to a given feasible set,
then it is also permissible relative to any subset containing the
alternative.
This condition is violated, for example, if x is judged permissible relative
to {x,y,z}, but is not judged permissible relative to {x,y}. If x is a winner
against y and z, why wouldn’t it also be a winner against y alone?
Alas, the possibility result disappears if Alpha is imposed:
Result 8: No theory of moral permissibility satisfies No Prohibition
Dilemmas, Alpha, Deontic Replication Invariance, Deontic Two-
Option Ultra Minimal Nonaggregative Priority, and Deontic Ultra
Minimal Aggregation.
To illustrate the proof, let us see how the deontic global complaint
model violates Alpha (while satisfying all the remaining conditions). Con-
sider again the example used to illustrate the proof of Result 7. We showed
how a deontic global complaint model based on the square-root weight-
ing of benefits judges the second-to-last option, ^1,1, . . .1,1,0,0;16&,
permissible. Consider now the case where only the last two options —
^1,1, . . .1,1,0,0;16& and ^1,1, . . .1,1;15.5&—are feasible. In this case,
^1,1, . . .1,1,0,0;16&will not be permissible, because now the complaints are
established solely in a comparison with ^1,1, . . .1,1;15.5& (instead of in
comparison with the greatest feasible benefit for an individual in the
earlier larger feasible set). And in this case, the greatest complaint in
^1,1, . . .1,1,0,0;16& is 1 (for the two people with 0), whereas it is less than
1 in ^1,1, . . .1,1;15.5& (namely, 0.5 for the person with 15.5). Hence, only
^1,1, . . .1,1;15.5& is permissible. Thus, ^1,1, . . .1,1,0.0;16& is judged permis-
sible from the larger feasible set, but not from the two-option subset,
which violates Alpha.
Given that the imposition of Alpha reintroduces the impossibility result,
a crucial question is whether Alpha is a plausible condition. Two of us
(Fleurbaey and Tungodden) believe that it is and thus deny that weak-
ening the priority condition to the two-option version avoids the impos-
sibility result. However, one of us (Vallentyne) believes that Alpha should
be rejected. The reasons have been given elsewhere, and we will therefore
only illustrate the concern here.15
Alpha is clearly a desirable condition for permissibility. The question,
however, is whether it is a mandatory condition —one that any minimally
adequate conception of permissibility must satisfy. To see just how strong
this condition is, it suffices to note that it is violated by several standard
kinds of theory. Consider, for example, a satisficing theory that judges an
15 Bertil Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne, “On the Possibility of Paretian Egalitarianism,”
Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 126–54.
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option to be permissible, relative to a feasible set, if and only if it is not
below the average (expected) value of options in the feasible set. This
violates Alpha, since, if enough below-average options are removed from
the feasible set, a given option can fall below the average value and thus
cease to be judged permissible. There are other minimally plausible deon-
tic theories that satisfy Alpha —such as the maximin relative benefit bar-
gaining theory of David Gauthier, the regret theory of Graham Loomes
and Robert Sugden, and Paretian egalitarianism.16 More generally, Sugden,
Amartya Sen, Edward F. McClennen, and Frances Kamm have argued
against the a priori imposition of Alpha.17 Thus, it is not obvious that
Alpha is a plausible a priori condition on permissibility.
Because we, the authors, are not in agreement about the status of Alpha,
we must leave open whether there is a way of avoiding the impossibility
result by weakening the priority condition while preserving its nonag-
gregative nature.
VI. Conclusion
We have been exploring nonabsolute forms of prioritarianism. Utili-
tarianism fails to give any priority to the worst off, and leximin gives
absolute priority to the worst off. One possibility is finitely weighted
prioritarianism, but we have suggested that it fails to give appropriate
priority to the worst off. For it allows that any benefit, no matter how
large, to a worst-off person in abject poverty can be outweighed by an
arbitrarily small benefit to enough extremely affluent people. We have
been seeking a form of prioritarianism that does not allow such aggre-
gative trade-offs. We have shown, however, that any moderate nonag-
gregative prioritarian theory of moral betterness or of practical moral
permissibility must violate some seemingly plausible conditions.
If one is to avoid moral nihilism, one or more of the seemingly
plausible conditions must be relaxed. We have suggested that (1) the
aggregation condition can be relaxed to open the possibility for moral
views based on minimizing the total prioritarian shortfall from the pov-
erty level, and (2) the nonaggregative priority condition can be relaxed
16 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (London: Oxford University Press, 1986); Graham
Loomes and Robert Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice
under Uncertainty,” Economic Journal 92 (1982): 805–24; Tungodden and Vallentyne, “On the
Possibility of Paretian Egalitarianism.”
17 Robert Sugden, “Why Be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements
in Choice Theory,” Economica, new series, vol. 52 (1985): 167–83; Amartya Sen, “Internal
Consistency of Choice,” Econometrica 61 (1993): 495–521, reprinted in Amartya Sen, Ratio-
nality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 121–57; Edward F.
McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
182–84, 240, 251; Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality II (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 343–44; Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 169–
73, 222 n. 16, 298, 484–487.
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to open the possibility, if no requirement of consistency is imposed, for
the deontic global complaint model, which seeks to minimize maxi-
mum prioritarian complaints.
Obviously, many people reject the need for some aggregation or the
need for nonaggregative priority. We have not attempted to defend these
assumptions. Instead, we have sought to explore the range of possibilities
that they leave open. Our main conclusion is that this range is not great
and that more investigation is needed in order to determine whether
there is a plausible form of moderate nonaggregative prioritarianism.
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